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INTRODUCTION 
33 
Caring for the vulnerable and dependent like people with chronic and 
severe mental illness has always been, in theOJY, a collaborative effort by 
society's fundamental institutions, Each of the four dynamic pillars of 
modern society (the state, market, family and charity), bas a long history of 
involvement in the care and support of the less fortunate. The less 
fortunate include people disabled with mental illness. The key focus of 
this article is the transformation that has taken place in regards to the 'care' 
and 'control' of people with serious mental illness in most advanced 
capitalist societies since the eighteenth cenhrry. 
The basic underlying question I am asking is whether the lives of people 
disabled with serious mental illness have improved, at least in terms of the 
traumas and extreme human suffering that they experience, since the 
dismantling of large institutions in the mid-1960s and the cessation of 
'warehousing' practices. The unusual degree of incoherence and volatility 
that characterise contemporary mental health policy and practice questions 
government claims that change from past policies and practices constitutes 
progress. 
This article consists of a historical survey that highlights critiques of the 
failure of previous lunacy reform interventions. I The greatest criticism of 
earlier reform strategies and initiatives is the consistency whh which they 
have failed to fulfil their promises, The charge of false promises can be 
levelled equally at more contemporary reforms based on ideals of 
community mental health care and control. The transition by rich Western 
, LLB (QUT), LLM (JeU). Senior Lecturer, James Cook University. 
1 1 adopt Richard Hensbel";: meanlllg of iniervention to include 'all of the 
conscious, organised efforts' to dlevi:J.te olle of the modern state's ongoing 
socia! ilb. See Richard Hen5hei. RcaClill'5 iC Soda! f'I'ODI!!ms Canadian Social 
Problem,; Series (19 7 6., 
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societies, from the Keynesian Welfare State model of the 1960s to a 
market/contract state model of the 1980s can, for some people with serious 
mental illness, be characterised as neither progress nor regress. 
The thesis of this article is that emphasis on the social control rather than 
the care of people disabled with serious mental illness mirrors, in modem 
forms, their past persecution and consequential extreme suffering and 
social exclusion. These contemporary forms of persecution and suffering 
should be understood as evidence of continuity of the oppression of people 
disabled with mental illness despite the rhetoric of modem reform. The 
principal focus is on two fundamental transformations (ideological and 
institutional) of the control system that relates to the mentally ill, 
principally the creation and the dismantling of the asylums. These reform 
interventions are of particular interest because they are the most 
outstanding in terms of their widespread exclusionary impact on the lives 
of those who became unwilling participants. 
The exclusion of people with serious mental illness continues despite the 
benign rhetoric that heralded their implementation. The first movement 
took place in England around the late eighteenth century and the second 
around the latter half of the twentieth century. Both involved major 
ruptures from the lunacy reform initiatives of their times and both resulted 
in extreme fonns of exclusion. 
The article is divided into three parts: part one discusses the cychcal 
pattern of mental health reform interventions over tlJe epochs. It contains a 
table that summa11ses key transformations in the control of people with a 
mental illness from pre-modem times to the present-day state of 
modernity. Part two gives a brief overview of the mental health system as 
it developed in England and then in Australia as part of the Great 
Incarcerations. In part three, I examine the system's transmutation tllrough 
the deconstruction of psychiatric institutions and the introduction of 
community-based mental health care. 
Instead of the word institutionalisation, I use the word 'incarceration'. The 
word is used here in a broad sense to mean more than physicalexc1usion 
like confinement in prisons or asylums. It includes the more subtle 
systems of surveillance and control of mentally ill people like modem 
involuntary treatment orders that involve a process of compulsory 
administration of drugs and therapies, despite their often pennanent and 
potentially lethal side effects. These serve to incarcerate those who do not 
confonn to the demands of those of 'sound mind'. The tenn 'archipelago' 
is used here as a metaphor of the different loci of care of the mentally ill 
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throughout the centuries. 2 With every new reform enterprise, these 
people are shifted from one form of incarceration to another, from one set 
of islands to another, under the wide umbrella of the 'deviancy control 
system'. This movement from place to place within an expanding orbit of 
homelessness is a consequence of the modernising process. A world that 
is . running out of places to put redundant human waste characterises 
present day modernity. 3 
An epochal grid of the deviancy control system based on the work of 
historians like Andrew Scull and Roy Porter, and especially the work on 
social control by sociologist Stanley Cohen is used to map the contours of 
the 'carceral archipelago' 4 . These scholars provide useful dimensions 
through which to view fundamental changes over the epochs. Their 
historiography of the control of the insane in eighteenth and nineteenth 
century England is used to locate and analyse cyclical patterns of 'reform' 
and development over time in the context of 'the system's original 
foundations' .5 
The deviance control system grid below does not attempt to challenge 
existing histories of social control or psychiatry. Instead, the grid 
summarises the rich history of 'lunacy reform' to provide an overview 
from which comparisons of past and present mental health policy and 
practices can be made. In particular, the grid's focus is on contemporary 
phenomena such as de institutionalisation and community mental health 
care. 
CYCLICAL PATTERNS OF SOCIAL INTERVENTION: 
SYMPTOMS OF CHAOS? 
M{)rrissey and Goldman describe the history of public intervention on 
bel1alf of people with mental illness as a 'cyclical pattern' of reforms based 
on an environmental approach to treatment and a new locus of care. 6 
Although they identifY three cycles of reform in the United States, similar 
patterns of reform have also been identified in the histories of Australia 
and other modem Western societies. The introduction of 'moral treatment' 
2 Stanley Cohen, Visions of Social Control: Crime, Punishment and Classification 
(1985) 14. 
3 Zygmtmt Bauman Wasted Lives Modernity and its Outcasts (2004). 
4 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish:' The Birth of the Prison (1979). See 
also, Michelle Perrot, L 'Impossible Prison (1978). 
5 Cohen, above n 2. 
6 Joseph MOlTissey and Howard Goldman, 'Cycles of Reform in the Care of the 
Chronically Mentally Ill' (1984) 35 Hospital and Community Psychiafly 785-
793. 
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and the asylum in the early nineteenth century was the first cycle; the 
second cycle was the mental hygiene movement and the rise of the 
psychopathic hospital in the early twentieth century; and the third cycle 
was the community mental health movement of the mid-twentieth 
century. 7 Each cycle promised that new forms oftreatroent would prevent 
the personal and societal problems associated with long-tenn mental 
disability, each eventually faltered. 8 
A detailed grid of cycles of reform reflected in techniques of social control 
has been developed from Stanley Cohen's work and is represented in the 
table below. The table provides an overview of the epochal, or 'master 
changes' in the social control of people perceived, and now classified as 
having chronic mental illness. 
Grid of Transfonnations in the Deviancy Control System for the Mentally 
III (gtid adapted from Cohen) 9 
Epoch 
Ideological 
transitions 
Management 
transitions 
Theories 
Treatment 
7 Ibid 785. 
S ThieL 
of 
Pre_1Stb C 
feudalism to 
capitalism & 
nation state; 
religion based to 
science based 
medicine 
Minimalist, 
decentralised state 
intervention 
Moral, classical 
school; 
metaphysics; 
Focus on 
controIlinll 'body'· 
9 Cohen, above n 2, 16-17 (Table 1). 
End 18th_early Mid 20t • Con 
19tb 
Rise of capitalist Keynesian welfare 
liberal state; decline state; democratic 
of religion citizenship to 
market state; 
individualism & 
redefinition of 
labour market. 
Centralised state 'Decentralisation 
control, Decriminalisation 
intervention Diversion'; 
intensified, 'destructuring' : 
rationalised; state divests 
rise of modern functions but 
bureaucracy intervention & 
control expands 
through growth in 
community based 
agencies and 
indirect state 
sponsorship 
Positivism based on . Return to 'justice' 
'just' treatment ideology, 'neo-
ideal; 'neo- classicism'; social 
positivist' focus on schools explain 
controlling 'mind' behaviour; focus or 
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neglect! & 'inner states'; body & mind but 
persecution at classification & shift to controlling 
vil1age level 'moral treatment' external behaviour 
& compliance rather 
than the minds or 
actors 
Control! 'open', 'inclusive' 'closed', segregated Back to mostly 
care primary institutions; 'open' community 
Framework institutions; incarceration alternative; de/non-
criminal law only theme; 'monopoly institutionalisation 
form of official of criminal justice theme; 
control system'; later Purpose built 
meutal health institutions remain; 
sy!>tem supplement mental health 
system expands but 
criminal justice 
system remains 
'Professional Not present; Psychiatry , de-professio-
dominance' . clergy dominant, established & grew nalization' , anti-
supplemented by to be expertise; psychiatry; pro-self-
law monopoly for help but dominance 
serVIces. by managers as 
professionals 
expand 
Impact on Assimilate or die Brutalisation of 'dependency' 
Mentally III insane; exclusion stigmatised but 
through internment; class influence (eg, 
state controlled for clinics for rich, 
life; no hostels & the streets 
identity/choice for poor); homeless 
demonised; social 
exclusion; 
assimilate or die. 
A Different Versions of History 
In the mental health field, the connections between 'reform' and 'progress' 
have come to be questioned by some social commentators. 10 Some reform 
enterprises impelled by the optimism of their creators have not turned out 
to be progressive. The false promises of lunacy reform interventions are, 
as Cohen suggests, evident from the inconsistency between what is said 
and what is done, what is apparent and what is real. Doubt and suspicion 
about the motives and the ideologies that are at the root of social 
transfonnations now abound. Hence, how a particular cycle of 
transformation is interpreted will depend on which of the different versions 
10 Ibid 20. 
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of history (based on a common set of 'factual' events as the table suggests) 
is adopted. 11 The hegemonlcofficial version of history depicts reforms as 
progressive and modernity as the epitome of progress. 
This version of history, premised on unilinear progress, presents reform 
enterprises, like the asylums as 'progressive' because they are based on 
benevolent, altruistic, and philanthropic ideas construed as victories of 
humanitarianism over barbarism and of 'scientific knowledge over 
prejudice and irrationality' .12 Cohen suggests that this version is plausible 
because the reforms replace 'early forms of punishment, based on 
vengeance, cruelty and ignorance' by 'informed, professional and expert 
intervention' .13 The immediate forerunner of the mental asylUms of the 
eighteenth century was centuries of witch-burning and the elimination of 
the 'mad' .14 Bauman's counter-hegemonic version of history highlights 
the regressive dimensions of modernity. 
Bauman characterises modernity as economic progress and a process that 
involves the quest for order ~ an incessant, obsessive process. 15 For 
Bauman, the 'project of modernity', if there ever was such a project, 'was 
the search for the state of perfection' .16 He uses liquids as a metaphor for 
the present phase of modernity because 'liquid modernity' is unlike earlier 
flxed forms of the modern world. 17 Liquid, Bauman says, 'makes salient 
the brittleness, breakabHity, ad-hoc modality of inter-human bond' .18 
I agree, above all, with Bauman's analysis of one important outcome of the 
spread of modernity, the production of waste, including 'human waste' or 
more precisely, 'wasted lives,.19 'Wasted lives' are human beings 
deprived of adequate means of survival because they are 'unneeded, of no 
use' in a world running out of places to put them. Theorizing about the 
II Ibid 15. 
12 Ibid 18. 
\3 Ibid. 
14 For critiques of different versions of the history of mental health refonns see, 
eg, Sheldon Gelman, 'Looking Backward: the Twentieth Century Revolutions 
in Psychiatry, Law, and Public Mental Health' (2004) 29 Ohio Northern 
University Law Review 531-585; Ralph Slovenko, 'The Transinstitutionalization 
of the Mentally Ill' (2004) 29 Ohio Northern University Law Review 641-659. 
1.1 Milena Yakimova, 'A postmodem grid of the worldmap? Interview with 
Zygmunt Bauman' (2002) Eurozine < http://www.eurozine.com/muc1es/2002-
11-08-bauman-en.html> at 13 July 2006. 
16 Ibid. 
11 Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity (2000) foreword. 
1~ Ibid. 
19 Zygmunt Bauman, Wasted Lives Modernity and its Outcasrs (2004). 
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production of human waste as the chronic and persistent exclusion of 
redundant populations, modernization makes the need to periodise 
modernity unnecessary. I depart from Bauman's liquid metaphor, 
however, in only one sense-for people disabled with mental illness, 
without money and without homes, their experience of modernity is 
concrete and replete with suffering and exclusion. For these people, their 
crisis of sUffering remains solid and fixed, not 'liquid' or 'fluid', despite 
the passage of time into present-day modemity. 
II REMEMBERING THE PAST: A CRITICAL HISTORY OF 'SOCIAL 
CONTROL' OF PEOPLE \NHH MENTAL ILLNESS 
A The Old System: Enlightenment Modernity - An 
'Inclusive' World? 
The seventeenth century was a period when 'external' or outdoor relief 
such as the provision of food for the 'deserving' or 'impotent' poor (some 
of whom were also intellectually impaired or mentally ill) was more 
common than 'internal' forms of relief provided in poor houses or 
almshouses. There was a paucity of purpose-built establishments to care 
for such people. 20 However, by the eighteenth century, official 
workhouses were built to provide work in exchange for relief. Those 
unable to work still had to fend for themselves or starve but for the relief 
provided by parish 'poor-houses'. 
B Modernity and the Victory of Rationality: Enter the 
Exclusive World 
The seventeenth century marks the 'golden age' for science in tenns of 
both the expansion of scientific research, and the development of the 
20 Two different classes of poor were created by the Old Elizabethan Poor Law of 
1601. These included: i) the 'impotent' poor such as the elderly, the sick and 
those unable to work., entitled to outdoor forms of" relief or to a place in an 
almshouse because they were unable to work and, Ii) the able bodied poor who 
were thought as being able to work. Members of the. latter group were 
susceptible to severe beatings until they realised the error of their ways. The 
type and level of relief offered also depended on the parishes to which the 
pauper belonged. Some were more sympathetic than others. In outline, this 
endured until the New Poor Law of the 1830s ended the Speenbamland System. 
See Marjie Bloy, The Old Poor Law 1795-1834 (2004) The Peel Web: A Web 
of English History 
<http://dspace.dial.pipelt.c0l11itovmiterrace/adw03/peelipooriaw/nlaa.htm:> at 2 
.Tune 2004. 
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concept that 'science is measurement' and therefore is more exact. 21 The 
majority of the indigent 'mad' or 'fools' in England was cared for by 
family members or kept under the watchful eye of the parish community. 22 
However, from the eighteenth century onwards, a modem concept of 
'rationality' and science became hegemonic. 
The use of reason and the desire of humans to become the masters and 
possessors of the earth became central to m,odernity.23 Science and 
technology, a market economy, the development of bureaucracy and 
formalisation of the law, literacy and education were all important 
modernisinp- nTfl~f'<!':!':p.!,: 24 As society increasingly defined itself as 
'rational' or 'normal', abnormality and irrational behaviour 'provoked 
anxiety' serving to further stigmatise the 'mad' -this time, as Porter points 
out, as having a total absence or perversion of reason.25 A Foucauldian 
account of the justification for hiding 'unreason', at least in the Classical 
Age26 , rests on intentions 'to prevent imitation, to safeguard the reputation 
of the Church, to preserve the honour of families or simply 'to avoid 
scandal' . 27 
By the nineteenth century, the avoidance of unreason ideology led to an 
intensified demand in England for institutions in which to detain those 
deemed lacking in reason. The 'different', 'difficult' or 'dangerous' 
lacked reason because they least conformed to the expectations of the 
central state or the market economy. 28 Scull's account of madness in the 
Victorian Era confrrms that some hmatics were kept behind locked doors 
2l Roberto Margotta, The Hamlyn History of Medicine (1996) 98. 
Z2 Roy Porter; 'Foucault's Great Confinement' (1990) 3 History of the Human 
Sciences 47-54, 48. 
23 In the Enlightenment (Europe in the late 17th and 18 th centuries) the appeal to 
reason was based on the desire to be freed from the bondage of false belief and 
the hierarchies offeudal society. But there are different the0l1es of modemity. 
In Theoretical Criminology: from modernity to post-modernity (1995) 
especially in Chapter 3, Wayne Morrison reproduces and provides a useful 
discussion of the theories of Max Weber, Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim and 
Fredrich Nietzsche 
24 Roy Porter, A Social History of Madness: Stories of the Insane (1987) 14 . 
. 2S Ibid. 
26 Foucault uses the tenn 'Classical Age' to refer to a period in his analysis of the 
developments in France. Foucauldian theories are rich and controversial but 
have been purposefully left out of this discussion because they are specific to a 
given period in French historiography sufficiently different to the English 
experience to resist their inclusion. 
27 Gary Gutting (ed), The Cambridge Companion to Foucault (1994) 58. 
2S Ibid 17; Andrew Scull (ed), Madhouses, Mad-doctors and Madmen: The Social 
Bistol), of Psychiatry in the Victorian Era (1981) 110. 
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of attics or in poorhouses, ahnshouses and eventually madhouses. 29 The 
incarceration of the mad was more of an expression of 'civil policy, an 
initiative of magistrates, philanthropists and families' who viewed it as 
best for everyone, including the lunatic in need of institutional discipline. 30 
Public opinion began to swing towards the idea that institutional or 
ps: ·chiatric fOTIns of relief, rather than external fonns, would be more 
appropriate in providing the necessary safeguards (based on concepts of 
surveillance and control) for society itself. 
The <Great Incarcerations' in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries were the. result of this process. The process represents the 
touchstone of what Cohen describes as the <first phase of 
transformation'. 31 Incarceration of the 'other' was a fundamental rupture 
with the past. Coercion was now the only 'natural' approach. All fonus of 
<conquered'peop1e, including the mad, had to be controlled by a single 
entity, the state. The state adopted the technology of the institutions to do 
this. The movement witnessed an increased involvement by the state and a 
shift from a decentralised arbitrary system to a centralised and rationalised 
system of social control through institutions. 
The nineteenth century witnessed the corralling of rural masses driven off 
the land into manufactories. The idea of work as the road leading 
simultaneously out of individual poverty and towards a wealthy nation 
rang true for the rational and nomla1. 32 Those that did not conform (the 
idle and the wretched) were warehoused in panoptical institutions.33 The 
objective was clear. Those who could not be reformed or converted 
toward a work ethic were beyond redemption and could provide no benefit 
or service to society. Such hopelessly idle persons had to be separated 
from the rest of the community to avoid 'morally morbid contamination'. 
Inmates were stripped of their legal rights and kept behind massive walls 
and locked doors, usually for life, mostly to die in filthy prisons or 
poorhouses. 34 
29 Porter, above n 24; also Scull, above n 28, 109. 
30 Ibid. 
3J Cohen, above n 2. 
32 Zygmunt Bauman, Work, Consumerism and the New Poor (2005). 
33 See Panopticon or the Inspection House containing the idea of a [lew principle 
of constmction available to any sort of establishment aiming to attain one 
standard of conduct by its inmates (persons of any description) who are to be 
kept under inspection, in B Bentham, The Works afJeremy Bentham Vol 4 
(1843) 40-126. 
34 Bauman, above n 32, 13-14. 
42 The,Incarceration Archipelago of Lunacy 'Refonn' 12JCULR 
C Classification, Science, Control and Change 
Early attempts to classify psychiatric disease were made in the eighteenth 
century. 35 In the 1790s, a handful of radical reformers like physician 
Philippe Pinel in France and Quaker tea merchant William Tuke in 
England36, were haranguers for propositions of 'moral' treatment37 The 
movement vehemently opposed what it saw as enonnous hanns 
perpetrated on the mad through barbaric, cruel and violent methods. 
Instead, it championed treatment based on kindness, reason and tactful 
manipulation aimed at remodelling the lunatic into the bourgeois ideal of 
the rational individual. 38 
The new system did not hold the insane to be absolutely deprived of 
reason,39 citing several cases that seemingly substantiated claims that 
insanity could be cured by humane methods.4o The idea of isolating the 
'distracted' into small, pastoral asylums away from bad influences in order 
to cure them eventually gained support. Through the humane 
reprograrruning of the inmates' minds through mental discipline, 
rectification and retraining in thinking, asylums were transformed into 
'schools' of refonn viewed as crucial instruments in the 'regeneration' 
41 process. 
1 Insanity as a Disease 
Early nineteenth century scientific advances brought new expectations that 
the causes of insanity would be found to be rooted in organic, neurological 
35 Margotta. above n 21, 178. 
36 Samuel Tuke, Description a/the Retreat (1813). Tuke founded a retreat in York 
arguing that 'madhouses' were not medical institutions. He provided humane 
care for insane Quakers that attracted attention first frOin English and foreign 
visitors and then from parliamentarians and others who had taken up the cause 
oflunacy refonn: at 141. 
37 Margotta, above n 21, 178. Pinel proposed that those physicians with 'strong 
personalities' could treat the insane without loss of dignity by means of moral 
persuasion rather than by counter productive methods like intimidation and 
torture. 
38 For a discussion on moral treatment see Scull, above n 28, l05-J 18; Porter, 
aboven24, 18, 106, 11l. 
39 Scull, above n 28,110. 
40 Ibid. See also Slovenko, above n 14. 
41 See R. Gardiner Hill, A Lecture on the Management of Lunatic Asylums (1839) 
4-6; J. Mortimer Granville, The Care and Cure o/the Insane (1877) 1, 15 cited 
in Scull, above n 28, 9. See also POlter, A Social Histol)' a/Madness, above n 
24, 19. 
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or biochemical disorders. 42 The practice of categonsrng and 
differentiating the insane from other forms of deviancy was now well 
established. Treatment at this time usually involved drug therapies,43 or 
physical and mechanical treatments. 44 The intention was that such 
treatments would 'pacify the body' and render the person receptive to 
45 . 
reason. 
It was also a time of the 'recbristianisation' of the now urban working 
classes, that demanded the reform of the 'character' of every workman to 
fit the new industrial system 46. and no doubt to dilute any tendencies 
towards political radicalism. 
This approach was compatible with the evolution of industrial capitalism, 
which in the nmeteenth century, had moved from the simple textile plant 
factory to more complex industries that demanded higher levels of 
knowledge and skill on the part of the workers. Industrial capitalism 
brought forth a mystifying, purely economic and 'objective' forcing of 
nearly all workers to labour for anotheL 47 Lunatics, like prisoners, came 
to be viewed as 'defective mechanisms', machines in need of repair that 
could be 'remoulded' or cured through confinement and the use of 'gentle 
discipline' in an asylum. 48 The rapid growth of such schemes during the 
course of the century arose from the rationale that if asylum psychiatry 
could cure the insane, the state apparatus that represented society's will 
had a duty to legislate and care for them until they were cured.49 
Alas, industrialisation and population growth were not always 
accompanied by a commensurate growth in employment opportunities. 
The rise in urban unemployment brought pauperism, social dependency 
42 Porter, above n 24, 18. 
43 For instance, in the form of bloodletting, vomits and laxatives. 
44 Including the use of electric-shock techniques, hot baths and cold showers, and 
restraining chairs, accompanied by the use of manacles, chains, whips, 
straitjackets, or manual labour. See William Cullen, First Lines in the Practice 
of Physic (4th ed, 1808) warning that although physical force that included the 
use of whips and stripes was necessary, stripes although appearing more severe, 
were much safer than strokes or blows about the head. 
45 Porter, above n 24, 18. Francis Willis, a psychiatrist of the times, was charged 
with treating the King, see Scull, above n 28, 107, 108. 
46 Sydney Pollard, The Genesis of Modern Management (1965) 297. 
47 Maurice Dobb, Studies in the Development o/Capitalism (1963) 7. 
48 Scull, above n 28,115; J. Howard, The State of the Prisons (1778) 8. 
49 The laws of England, so far as they applied to the circumstances in Australia, 
applied in the colonies until Australia passed its own legislation such as the 
Lunacy Act 1898 (NSW) and the Lunacy Statute 1867 (Vic). 
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and dangerous deviancy that led to demands for institutional care and 
control as a major social concern. The Poor Law of 1834 was introduced 
to provide external forms of relief by way of the publicly funded assistance 
to be administered by Vestries-but only for the 'deserving,50 poor.51 
The state responded to the escalating problem by expanding the capacity of 
existing facilities and building larger ones. For the mentally ill, beneficial 
therapeutic practices based on smaller caseloads Hnd intimate staff-patient 
relationships were eroded._ The incessant rise in chronic cases (some of 
which had migrated to the cities from poorer rural regions after being 
driven off the land) ensured a precipitous drop in 'cure' rates. 52 
Wealthier families responded to the crisis in quality care by directing their 
funds towards endowing the construction and expansion of private 
institutions to care for their 'addled' relatives, who were usually described 
as 'voluntary' patients. 53 Public funds, on the other hand, were allocated 
for the establishment of separate state run institutions primarily for 
involuntary and indigent mentally ill people. 54 The central purpose of 
state asylums was custodial care and community protection. This came to 
be defined and regulated by legislation. Treatment was a secondary 
concem. 55 The emergence of a few psychiatric hospitals linked to 
universities facilitated the study of mental illness; however, this did not 
dissuade a general acceptance that the 'mad' were destined to remain in 
state institutions for life. 
50 These were individuals who could show they could not support themselves, had 
nowhere else to turn, and truly were unable to alleviate their own distress. See 
Robert Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable-a Reanalysis of Our Social 
Responsibilities (1985) 147. 
51 The undeserving poor included, for instance, the idle, extravagant or profligate, 
see Bloy, above n 20. See also, David Schmidtz and Robert Goodin, Social 
Welfare and Individual Responsibility, For and Against (1998) 173. Goodin 
states that traces of the underlying ideology of the Poor Law remains in 
contemporary policies and laws. This he points out is powerfully reflected in the 
traditional and deliberate political practice of setting welfare benefits lower than 
in the workplace in the hope of driving prospective claimants back to work. 
s'M . 
- ornssey and Goldman, above n 6, 786. 
53 This was not always the case. Laws were written that allowed relatives (mainly 
men) to have their inconvenient family members 'committed' with the help of 
cooperative doctors as was the case of T.8. Eliot's wife who was 'committed' 
against her wilL 
54 MOlTissey and Goldman, above n 6, 787. 
5j Ibid. 
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o The Birth of Psychiatry 
Along with the birth of the asylum came a new legally recognised group of 
expert doctors, the psychiatrists. Their professional identity consolidated 
in England with the formation of the Association of Medical Officers of 
Asylums and Hospitals for the Insane in 1841, later becoming the Royal 
College of Psychiatrists in 1971. 56 The new experts incited new hope of 
curing the insane through fresh medical the0l1es of insanity which spurred 
on the injection of new funds. 
With the rise in experts crone the further classification of the mentally ill. 
Mental illness once viewed as separate from deviance expanded into new 
sub-classes such as alcoholics 57, sex maniacs, paralytics or the criminally 
insane, adding to the burden of public asylums. 58 In time, regimes based 
on moral treatment collapsed with the growth in the size and population of 
institutions. 59 A gaping fissure between promise and fulfilment became 
apparent and, towards the latter decades of the nineteenth century, signs of 
failure were evident Control, not care, was the primary function of the 
asylum. Further, disillusionment about finding a 'cure' for insanity, led to 
erosion of public support and further cuts on expenditures. 
A sprinkling of 'radicals' lobbied for the return of apparently harmless 
chronic lunatics to their homes in the community. This was met with 
strong opposition from a variety of different stakeholders. The 
psychiatrists, for instance, voiced strong opposition to the release of 
patients deemed to be clearly in need of confinement. 60 Their monopoly 
on psychiatric services depended on the existence of asylums in which to 
practice. Opposition also came from a public who feared it was not safe to 
56 Scholarly Societies Project, Royal College of Psychiatrists (2006) 
<http:www.scholarly-societies.org/historyI184Ircp.html> at 8 August 2006. 
57 A push to characteJ.1se alcoholism as a 'disease' began to emerge in the United 
States in the early nineteenth century with a view to providing alcoholics with 
institutional care in facilities separate from those for criminals and lunatics. 
Although England, Canada, Australia and New Zealand similarly recognised the 
need for differentiated institutional care for alcoholics, Carney states that the 
dearth of historical records in the early pa11 of the century suggests that 
specialised facilities did not occur until the latter half of the century. See Terry 
Camey, Drug Users an the Law in Australia: from Crime Coniml to Welfare 
(1987) 2-3. 
53 Porter, above II 24, 20. For an illsightful discussion on the history of civil 
treatment legislation in England, Scotland, Canada, the United States and 
Australia, see Camey, above I' 57. 
59 Scull, above n 28, 13. 
GO Ibid 16. 
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have lunatics roaming at large or from poor families struggling with the 
intolerable burden of caring for 'mad' relatives. 61 
By the end of the nineteenth century, early signs of a fragmenting mental 
health care system were clearly visible in most capitalist states. In 
Australia, for instance, public confidence in the care of people in asylums 
diminished with the release of scandalous reports of inhumane treatment. 62 
Public confidence in psychiatrists as professionals was also seriously 
impaired by the development of fierce rivalry between neurologists and 
psychiatrists. In their later work, German psychiatrist, Emil Kraepelin, 
and Austrian psychoanalyst, Sigmund Freud, exemplified the growing 
rivalry between disciplines. 63 Rival theories of mental illness, the 
suitability of asylums as places for treatment of the insane, the respective 
merits of each discipline's understanding and treatment of mental 
disorders64 and for funds from the state and from the private benefactors 
were all sources of friction. Their ideological rivalries were 
simultaneously scientific, political and economic and they persist today. 
Continued lack of medical certainty about the causes and cures for insanity 
created major conflict on another front-this time between psychiatry and 
the law. Scull explains that the focus of debate rested in profoundly 
controversial matters, such as the evaluation techniques used to certifls 
someone as mentally ill and the issue of culpability in criminal law. 5 
Psychiatrists resented the doubt cast on their decisions by lawyers arguing 
that their privileged knowledge of the brain, nervous tissue and neural 
blood circulation 'ought to secure for their judgements a unique and 
unchallengeable truth status' .66 In much legal discourse, however, a 
'commonsense approach' is adopted to determine the intention of 
wrongdoers. This is the central issue, since intentionality fonns the legal 
61 Ibid. 
62 New South Wales, for instance, conducted its first parliamentary inquiry on 
mental health services in 1877. See Legislative Council, Parliament of New 
South Wales, Select Committee on Lunatic Asylum (1877). 
63 For Kraepelin, the fundamental causes of mental illness lay in the physiology 
and biochemistry of the hmnan brain, hence psychiatric disorders, as disease 
entities, could be classified like physical illnesses. Psychiatrists such as Freud, 
offered 'the talldng cW'e' as another therapeutic innovation which in tune, also 
proved unsuccessful in curing madness. Porter, above n 24,21. See also Mental 
Illness (2000) 
<http://www .iversonsofiware.col11Jreferencefpsvchologv Imental illness,htm> at 7 
December 2000. 
64 Scull, above n 28, 16. 
65 Ibid 24. 
66 Ibid 26. 
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mens rea basis of voluntary criminal acts. For Scull, the choice between 
these two approaches was and remains inherently. evaluative. 67 
Psychiatrists who contested this were 'repeatedly impeached' by their 
inability to agree on a diagnosis. <18 
Scull describes 'organised psychiatry' as ongmating in part as an 
entrepreneurial response to the opportunities offered by the creation of an 
asylum system rather than as 'the logical institutional expression of an 
expanding body of knowledge or the crystallization of particular 
therapeutic techniques'. 69 Further psychiatry's inability to cure mental 
illness, coupled with growing reports of cruel and inhumane treatment of 
residents in institutions, whether in spite of or because of the ruling 
'theories of madness', served to erode pUblic confidence in psychiatry and 
asylums. 
However, the turn of the twentieth century brought a new wave of 
humanitarian reform energy devoted to the search for 'alternatives' to the 
failed practices of the past. Ideas of 'administrative flexibility, discretion 
and greater choice of dispositions', coupled with the ideal of 'individual 
treatment, the case by case method and the entry of psychiatric doctrines' 
formed the basis for a whole series of innovations in the criminal justice 
sy;;:tem and the mental health care system. 70 Yet" like their predecessors, 
these refonn enterprises also failed to produce the results that their 
designers had hoped. 71 Again, the suffering and exclusion of people with 
sedous mental illness persisted. 
E Twentieth Century Treatment 
Psychoanalysis brought about a paradigm shift in early twentieth century 
psychiatry. This was followed by the neurological-pharmacological 
revolution. 72 The result of cross-pollination in new scientific methods of 
research, and new discoveries in different developing fields like 
biochemistry and pharmacology led to the development of new fonns of 
biological treatments. Three such treatments that date from the 1930s 
include insulin coma therapy, electroconvulsive therapy and lobotomy. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid 17. 
70 Cohen, above n 2, 20. 
71 Ibid. . 
72 In his critique of the historiography of psychiatry, Gelman points out that rather 
than complement psychoanalysis, some pOltray medications as a force 'that 
undennined psychoanalysis'. See Gelman, above n 14, 551. 
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These major therapies presented alternatives to psychoanalysis and the 
'warehousing' of patients. 73 
Yet, each reform, in turn, was found to harbour serious risks for patients 
and each, in turn, came to be criticised in terms of efficacy. 74 For 
example, insulin coma therapy in the United States had a death rate of 
about one per hundred; drug induced convulsions produced horrible side 
effects depending on the convulsive drug used on tenified patients; frontal 
lobotomy caused enormous harm in the form of irreversible brain 
damage. 75 Frontal lobotomy was the only 'treatment' of the three that 
came to be described as ethically 'indefensible'. Decline in public 
confidence in the procedure eventually lead to its abandonment by the 
early 1950s. 76 Electro-convulsive treatment continues especially for 
severe depression. 
After the Second World War, new forms of biological treatments emerged. 
This time, change was in the form of the dismantling of the asylums and 
the apparently more humane 'chemical incarceration' of the mentally ill in 
the community. 
III THE DAWN OF A NEW EpOCH? DEINSTITUTIONALISATION 
AND COMMUNITY CARE 
The end of the Second World War marked a crucial period of fundamental 
change that would come to initiate Morrissey and Goldman's 'third cycle' 
of mental health care reform-community based mental health care. The 
community based mental health movement was sparked by enthusiasm that 
flowed from optimistic psychiatrists returning from military service whose 
interest in preventing mental illness was stimulated by the level of success 
produced by brief hospitalisation techniques used in the United States to 
treat 'war neurosis' . 77 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Edward Shorter, A Hist01Y a/Psychiatry From the Era a/The Asylum to the Age 
o/Prozac (1997) 212-216 in Gelman, above n 14,552. 
76 Ibid 557-559. The kind of supposed successes portrayed by optimistic 
psychiatrists were unsubstantiated and 'outlandish'. See also, Sheldon Gelman, 
Medicating Schizophrenia (1999) 23-27. 
77 Morrissey and Goldman, above n 6, 7S8. 
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A The Human Rights Revolution 
The post World War period was also a paradigm shifting period in terms of 
international political, economic and social activity. Rich Western 
societies spoke of a renewed commitment to the promotion of democracy. 
A human rights revolution was sparked by the recognition of the Holocaust 
and the need for an ambiguous bundle of human rights through the drafting 
of the United Nations Charter. 78 The United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights79 proclaimed 'the will of the people shall be 
the basis of the authority of government' and each individual human being 
was endowed with these rights regardless of age, gender, class, race, 
ethnicity or sexuality. In 1966, a second instrument, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)80 promoted the protection 
of participatory rights and freedoms of every individual. 81 These newly 
packaged bundles of rights were labelled 'universal' and 'international' but 
not every nation endorsed them. 
The post World War II human rights revolution included recognition of 
participatory rights of specific vulnerable groups, including people with 
physical and psychiatric disabilities in many advanced-capitalist societies. 
These eventually received national endorsement. 82 In Australia, for 
78 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC), Human Rights & 
Mental Illness: Report of the National Inquiry into the Human Rights of People 
with Mental Illness (1993) 20. 
79 GA Res 217A, 3,d sess, 183rd plen mtg, UN Doc Al8l0 at 71 (1948). This 
Declaration, adopted by the General Assembly on 10 December 1948, was a 
reformation of declarations made in the late eighteenth century in France and 
the United '3tates. 
80 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 19 
December 1966, GA Res 2200A (XXI), 999 UNTS 171, UN Doc Al6316 
(1966) (entered into force 23 March 1976, entered into force for Australia 13 
November 1980, except Article 41 which entered into force on 28 January 
1993).This Covenant was adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 
1966. 
81 Office of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights, Democracy 
(1996-2004) <http://www.ohchr.org/Englishlissues/democracy/index.htm> at 6 
October 2006 (quoting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 'The will of 
the people shall be the basis of the authority of Government'). 
82 In particular, see The Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the 
Improvement of Mental Health Care, OA Res 119, UN GAOR, 46th session, 
75th plenary meeting, UN Doc AiRes/46/119 (1991). See also Lawrence Gostin, 
'Human Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities: The European Convention 
of Human Rights' (2000) 23 International Journal of Law and PsychiatlY 125-
159; Convention on the Rights ojthe Child, opened for signat-ure 7 March 1966, 
4 A TS 1991, art 24( 1) (entered into force 2 September 1990, entered into force 
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mstance, the Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness 83 
was enshrined in the. National Mental Health Strategy of 1992. The 
Strategy, designed to overhaul the mental health system in Australia, put 
forward an ambitious five-year agenda that broadly consisted of three 
aims: i) to promote the mental health of the community and where 
possible, prevent the development of mental health problems and mental 
disorders; ii) reduce the impact of mental disorders on individuals, families 
and the community; and notably iii) assure the rights ofpeople with mental 
illness. The Princrles have since been articulated in several major 
national documents. 8 
The human rights revolution was responsible for creating the 
platform necessary for social reformers and health and welfare 
advocates to argue for the right of return for long-term residents of 
large psychiatric institutions to their lives in the community. The 
human rights phenomenon was only one of four changes largely 
attributed to the shift. The other three contributory changes include 
the redefining of health to include social and mental components, 
psychopharmacological advancements and the discovery of new 
psychotropic drugs, and the development of innovative forms of 
psychosocial interventions. 85 
for Australia 16 January 1991); International Convention on Elimination of All 
Fonns of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature 7 March 1966, UNTS 
195, art. 5{e)(iv) (entered into force for Australia 30 October 1975 except 
Article 14 which entered into force for Australia 28 January 1993); Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened for 
signature 18 December 1979, 9 ATS 1983, art. 11(1)(f), 12 (entered mtoforce 
3 September 1981, entered into force for Australia 27 August 1983) (CEDA W). 
B3 The Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental 
Health Care, GA Res 119, UNGAOR, 46th sess, 75th plen mtg, UN Doc 
AlResf46/119 (1991). 
84 These include the Australian Health Ministers Mental Health Statement of 
Rights and Responsibilities Report of the Mental Health Consumer Outcomes 
Tasliforce (991); the National Mental Health Policy (1992); the National 
Mental Health Plans (1992), (1998), (2004); and the Medicare Agreements 
(1993-1998). 
85 World Health Organisation, World Health Report 2001 Mental Health: Ne-w 
Understanding New Hope (2001) <http://wv.''N.who.intlwhr/200l> at 24 August 
2002. 
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B The Expansion of the Scope of Health to Include the 
Right to Mental Health 
By stating in 1947 that, 'the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard 
of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being', the 
World Health Organization was responsible for expanding the scope of 
health. 86 Setting aside questions of the enforceability of this new right to 
health,87 the stage was set for the emergence of a utopian vision of a 'right 
to health'. Most notably, the Universal Declaration bestowed on 
'everyone' the right to a standard of living adequate for his or her health 
and well being. 88 
The advancement of human wellbeing, however, is a formidable task. 
This is especially so when the area of public health struggles to develop 
and articulate a conceptual framework, or as the late Jonathan Mann wrote, 
'a vocabulary with which to speak about and identify commonalties among 
health problems experienced by very different populations,.89 The term 
'mental health' remains particularly ambiguous, being virtually impossible 
to measure. Nonetheless, it has come to be understood as more thaJ.l just 
the absence of mental disorder. 90 Australian policy makers adopted 
Canada's definition of 'mental health' because it 'appropriately identifies 
mental health as a multi-dimensional, dynamic and interactive 
phenomenon'. 91 Mental health is: 
the capacity of the individual, the group and the environment to interact 
with one another in ways that promote subjective well-being, the optimum 
development and use of mental abilities (cognitive, affective and 
relational), the achievement of individual and collective goals consistent 
with justice and the attainment and preservation of conditions of 
fundamental equality. 92 
86 World Health Organisation, 'Constitution' in Basic Documents (361b ed, 1946). 
87 See Jonathan Mann et aI, 'Health and Human Rights' (1994) 1 Health and 
Human Rights 7; Sylvia Bell, 'Rationing the Right to Health' (1998) 6 Journal 
of Law and Medicine 83; Ian Freckelton and Bebe Loff, 'Health Law and 
Human Rights' in David Kinley (ed) Human Rights in Australian Law (1998) 
290. 
88 Article 25(1). 
89 Jonathan Mann, 'Medicine and Public Health, Ethics and Human Rights' 
Hastings Center Report (1997) (May~Jlme) 8. 
90 Basil Hetzel, Health and Australian Society (1974) 16-18; Gordon Edlin and 
Eric Golanty, Health and Welll1ess: A Holistic Approach (1988) 4; L J 
Donaldson and R J Donaldson, Essential Public H eaIth (1993) 320. 
9) Commonwealth Department of Human Services and Health, Mental Health in 
Australia: A Review o/Current Activities and Future Directions (1994) xii. 
92 Ibid 3 (citing the Canadian Department of National Health and Welfare (1988». 
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Despite ambiguities about the meaning of mental health or its assessment, 
psychiatric institutions were criticised as the wrong vehicle for providing 
health and community services.93 An appreciation of the history of 
institutional care that emphasised control, confinement and exclusion from 
mainstream community life through a regime of surveillance, silence and 
brutality provides a useful context for understanding the strength of the 
criticism against it. 'Large', 'overcrowded' and 'inhumane' are the stock 
attributes synonymous with nineteenth and twentieth century state asylums 
and with large psychiatric hospitals in general. Influential critics such as 
Goffinan94 , human rights advocacy groups, lobby groups, families and 
friends were instrumental in achieving the ensuing shift to community care 
for particular client groups like those with physical or mental disabilities. 
C Deinstitutionalisation Movement 
As it had been for the creation of asylums, expert opinion was an 
important factor in the mid-twentieth century in influencing the 
deinstitutionalisation movement. Advocates of the initiative optimistically 
embraced the experts' reform rhetoric. Economists, for instance, 
calculated the costs of institutional care and compared them with the lower 
anticipated community mental health care costs. These calculations 
provided credible support of official rhetoric that assured the public that 
funds formerly allocated to institutions would not only be redirected 
towards the community mental health project, but would be more cost-
effective. What was not stressed was that much of the burden would be 
shouldered by families. Alternatively, the burden would fall on the 
shoulders of those least able to bear it-the mentally ill themselves, 
resulting in their suffering and exclusion. 
Scientists and large private pharmaceutical companies fillther supported 
the movement. New psychotropic drugs were created reassuring the public 
on safety. The new drugs were promoted as fundamental to managing the 
symptoms of some mental illnesses, allowing many of the formerly 
institutionalised to 'safely' return to their lives in the community. Of 
course the most severe and acute cases were to remain under the close 
smveillance of the state mental health services. Changes in mental health 
legislation allowed for supervised and community care orders to develop 
93 David Mechanic and Linda Aiken, 'Iruprovmg the care of patients with chronic 
mental illness' (1987) 317 New England Journal of Medicine 1634-1638. 
94 Erving Goffinan, Asylums: essays on the social situation of mental patients and 
other inmates (first published 1961, Penguin Books 1991) 17. 
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as the new tools to facilitate the process. 95 The level of supervision and 
control over a person's freedom to pursue his or her aspirations in the 
community was to be determined by officials able to accurately weigh the 
risk of 'harm' to both the individual and to the public. 
Particularly in light of the expanding list of disclosed scandals and publicly 
reported failures under the state mstitutional model in Australia96 , as with 
all other welfare states, the lure of the community mental health proposals 
proved irresistible for most political decision makers. Growing pressure 
for economic savings fuelled by neo-liberal97 refonn policies for 
downsizing the public services sector emerging in most advanced capitalist 
states sealed the shift. 
o The Market State Revolution and the Community Care 
Project 
The latter decades of the twentieth century are marked by the 
transfonnation of the state. It is a period when the state changed its form 
from the 'safety state' (also known as the post war Keynesian Welfare 
State) to the 'marketlcontract state'. The safety state was based on 
promises of security in the form of welfare provided by state institutions, 
science and technology. The state's transformation into the market state 
brought new economic rationalist refonn policies. 
The market or contract state is characterised by the ever-growing use of 
the 'language and practice of contract' in the organisation of social and 
95 For instance, in each jurisdiction in Australia, legislation provides for the 
compulsory treatment of people with mental illness while living in the 
community. See Mental Health (Treatment and Care) Act 1994 (ACT) s 29; 
Mental Health and Related Services Act 2002 (NT) s 45; Mental Health Act 
1990 (NSW) s 131; Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld) s 109; Mental Health Act 
1996 (Tas) s 40; Mental Health Act 1993 (SA) s 17; Mental Health Act 1986 
(Vic) s 14; Mental Health Act 1996 (WA) s 67. 
96 For instance, in Australia the highly controversial and publicised inquiries and 
subsequent closures of the Chelmsford Hospital in Sydney and Ward lOB in 
Townsville. See New South Wales, Royal Commission Into Deep Sleep 
Therapy, Report (1990); Queensland, Commission of Inquiry into the Care and 
Treatment of Patients in the Psychiatric Unit of the Townsville General Hospital 
Between 2nd March 1975 and 20th February 1988, Report (1991). 
97 For a meaning of 'neo-liberal' see, eg, Nikolas Rose, 'Governing "Advanced" 
Liberal Democracies' in Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose 
(eds) Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and 
Rationalities of Government (1996) 37-65. 
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political lik 98 It is a period of transformation and change in which the 
individual citizen of the 'welfare state' has come to be transformed into the 
individual citizen-client, citizen-producer or citizen-consumer in the 
'contract (iug out) state' 99 , or 'brokerage state,IOO of late modernity. For 
Havemann, this period exemplifies 'the move~nent from simple 
modernization to reflexive modernization'. lOl 
The process of decommissioning large institutions is now a fact in most 
market societies. Common to the process has been a series of 
programmatic shifts that led to a change in the locus of care for people 
with mental illness from institutions to the conununity.102 One such shift 
is the mainstreaming' or centralisation. of mental health services. 103 The 
ideological sources of mainstreaming are diverse. l04 For the pUlposes of 
this discussion, mainstreaming is the policy concept that co-locates mental 
health services with general health services (leaving some specialised 
mental health services to ensure the continuity of clinical management of 
the most severe cases). )05 
98 Whereas previously, the use of contract was more confmed to areas of 
cornmerciallaw and liberal political theory, different versions of the concept are 
now applied to the management of a wide range of social problems. B Sullivan, 
'Mapping Contract' in G Davis, B Sullivan and A Yeatman (eds) The New 
Contractualism? (1997) 1-13. 
99 P Havemann, 'Social Citizenship, Re-commodification and the Contract State' 
in EChristodoulidis (ed) Communitarianism and Citizenship (1998) 134. 
100 Terry Carney and Gaby Ramia, 'Contractualism and Citizenship: Rivals or 
Bedfellows?' (2001) 18(2) Law in Context 8, 15-16. 
10) Havemann provides a comprehensive list of the diverse 'emancipatory "goods" 
and 'apocalyptic '~bads", drawn in part from the literature, that characterise the 
contradictory and complimentary dimensions of 'reflexive modernisation'. See 
HavemaIUl, above n 99, 135. 
102 For an insightful accotmt of the us experience see Leona Bachrach, 'What We 
Know About Homelessness Among Mentally III Persons: An Analytical Review 
and Commentary' (1992) 43 Hospital and Community Psychiatry 453. 
103 Service integration became a major focus of the First National Mental Health 
Plan in Australia and by Jtme 2000, an States and Territories had transferred the 
management of public mental health services to the mainstream health system. 
104 To make full sense of the neo-liberalmovement, it is necessary to understand 
how tendencies from the anarchist 'Leftists' of the 19608 such as the anti-
psychiatry movement impelled by Ken Kesey and RD Laing for instance, came 
a distrust of all large institutions; and from the libertarians on the Right, came a 
distrust of all governmental bureaucracy and a desire to shrink government 
sector in all areas re-enforced one another. But properly speaking, only the 
latter can be called 'neo-liberal'. 
105 NSW Parliamentary Library Research Service, 'The Burdekin Report - Human 
Rights and Mental Illness: Report of the National Jnquiry into the Human 
Rights ofPeopIe wiiliMental Illness', Briefing PaperNo 004 (1993) Ii cited in 
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One of the tangible ill-effects of deinstitutionalisation of mental health 
services has been a reduction in beds in psychiatric institutions. In 
Australia, for example, it is estimated that between 1992 (when the 
National Mental Health Strategy was accepted by all Australian Ministers) 
and June 2000, the number of beds in stand-alone psychiatric institutions 
fell by 3,097 or 53%.ltl6 Over the life of the Strategy, it has been estimated 
that resources released through institutional downsizing were transfelTed to 
fund 44% of the total growth in community based and general hospital 
services. 107 This involved a 68% increase in the number of beds in 24-
hour staffed community residential units designed to replace psychiatric 
institutions. But, as in most other jurisdictions that engaged in this reform 
strategy, mainstteaming soon produced a ct1sis in the availability of beds. 
E Concerns about A vailabifity of Care 
Presently, the lack of available beds for people in acute crisis situations is 
a lethal problem of growing concem to professionals and community 
organisations. lOS The rise of 'double-diagnosis' patients, due to the 
increasing availability of 'street' drugs, has exacerbated the acute care 
needs. The old 'warehousing' role of mental hospitals was cruel., wasteful 
and served no social purpose. But the lack of 'acute' beds is a different 
issue. People with serious mental illness, now living in the community, 
experience a crisis of extreme human suffering. Such crisis of suffering is 
not from the physical and mental trauma of being incarcerated but from 
their exclusion from appropriate housing and support services, including 
access to hospitalisation during acute phases of illness. Hl9 This represents 
the outcome of the latest failed 'lunacy reform ,.mterprise' 1 have 
discussed. 
New South Wales, Legislative Council Select Committee on Mental Health, 
Inquiry Into Mental Health Services in New South Wales Final Report 
(December 2002) 38. 
106 Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care, The National Mental 
HealthReport 2002 Mental Health and Special Programs Branch 3. 
107 Ibid 4. 
108 Submission by the National Association of Practicing Psychiatrists to NSW 
Legislative Council Select Committee on Mental Health, above n 105, 41-43; 
Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care, above n 106, 4. 
109 See the latest national report by the Mental Health Council of Austraha, Not for 
Service: EJ.periences of Irg'ustice and Despair in Mental Health Care in 
Australia (2005) Mental Health Council of Australia. 
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Potentially, mainstreaming can create an inequity of access problem. For 
instance, to receive mental health treatment and care, people may prefer to 
present themselves at the emergency department of a public hospital rather 
than undergo the stigmatisation of having to go to a psychiatric institution. 
But the lack of mental health units within some public hospitals translates 
into inequitable distribution. Health planners often fail to accurately assess 
the demand for chospital beds. When they use 'theoretical' or 'average' 
provisions fonnulae, such assessments tend to inadequately reflect needs 
in areas where the 'occupancy and demand for long stay and rehabilitation 
beds are above average', or where there is 'no hospital accommodation 
available on a state-wide basis' .110 In such situations, mainstreaming does 
not produce an equitable distribution and subverts a key ideal of the 
community treatment approach. 
F Criticisms of the Community Care Enterprise 
As with earlier refonn initiatives, deinstitutionalisatian has drawn 
criticism. Much of the criticism targets the diversity in standards of 
organisation and planning for the after care of patients with serious mental 
illness discharged into the community. The low quality support for these 
people after discharge, the inappropriate housing and the lack of adequate 
long-teml community residential facilities are core concerns. ll1 Upon 
closer scrutiny, deinstitutionalisatiol1 and mainstreaming strategies have 
failed to address the problems and hardship experienced by people with 
chromc serious mental illnesses. 
G Mental Health Care and Control in the Community 
Some critics ardently contend that community based mental health care 
has exacerbated the plight of chronic patients leaving them worse off than 
institutionalisation. 112 In most modem market societies, de/non-
llO NSW Legislative Council Select Committee on Mental Health, above n 105, 
43-44. 
111 H Richard Lamb, 'Lessons Learned from deinstitutionalisation in the US' 
(1993) 162 British Journal of Psychiatry 587; Carl Cohen and Kenneth 
Thompson, 'Homeless mentally in or mentally ill homeless?' (1992) 149 
American Journal of Psychiatry 816; D Double and T Wong, 'What's 
Happened to Patients from Long-Stay Psychiatric Wards?' (1991) 15 
Psychiatric Bulletin 735. 
112 Morrissey and Goldman, above n 6,789; John Zadolinny and Karen ZadoliIIDY, 
'Deinstitutionalisation of Mental Health Services' (991) 1(4) Australian 
Journal of Mental Health NurSing 1; Ellen Bassuk and J Gerson, 
'Deinstitutionalizatiol1 and mental health services (1978) 238(2) Scientific 
American 46; E Gruendberg and J Archer, 'Abandonment of responsibility for 
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institutionalisation has been associated with the rise of homelessness, 
social exclusion, extreme human suffering and traumas experienced by 
people with mental illness, all of which escalate in seriousness for those 
whose illness is more severe. l13 Yet, opinions in the literature differ on the 
extent to which bomelessness and substance abuse are really products of 
the deinstitutionalisation process itself. 
For some, that process is responsible, at least in part, for people with 
mental health problems being forced to live in unsatisfactory 
circumstances.l!4 Others blame the individuals themselves for somehow 
'causing' their own mental illness and hence their homelessness, 
particularly where the person is doubly stigmatised because of an 
accompanying substance abuse disorder. lI5 The National Coalition for the 
Homeless blames the rise in homelessness since the mid 1980's largely on 
two trends: the growing shortage of affordable rental housing and a 
the serlously mentally ill' (1979) 57 Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly 485; 
Peter Braun et aI, 'Overview: Deinstititionalization of Psychiatric Patients, a 
critical review of outcome studies' (1981) 138 American Journal of Psychiatry 
736. 
113 Virginia Hiday et aI, 'Victimization: A link between mental il1ness and 
violence?' (2001) 24 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 559; L 
Frency, 'Victimisation of the Mentally Ill: An Unintended Consequence of 
Deinstitutionalisation' (1987) 32 Journal o/Social Work 502; H Richard Lamb, 
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addictive and mental disorders: implications for prevention and service 
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simultaneous increase in 'new' poverty1l6-both issues squarely within the 
federal government's p011folios. 
The sheer breadth of the problem of homelessness in societies that have 
embraced the de/non-institutionalisation movement suggests that political 
leaders failed to anticipate, or at least to accurately appreciate, the extent 
of the shortage of appropriate low-cost housing in the community prior to 
implementing the process. 
However, in some jurisdictions, like England, where the movement toward 
community-based care and services1l7 has for over half a century been 
characterised by continuous incremental development rather than by a 
<single stage introduction of a wide ranging policy of refonn', liS 
homelessness for people with mental illness has not been specifically 
associated with the closure of psychiatric hospitals.119 This may be 
explained by the slower than originally envisaged closure oflarge asylums 
in the United Kingdom despite government policy to do so since the 
1960s. The United Kingdom also has a stronger traclition of socialised 
medicine than either the United States or Australia. Problems of crime and 
vagrancy among former long-stay in-patients placed in the community 
have also been fewer than in the United States and elsewhere. 120 
116 <New' poverty refers to the postLUodem disarray and despair associated with 
poverty and social insecurity at the end of the 20th century. Despite a-century of 
rhetoric about improving the lives of low socio economic families, the rise In 
lmemployment as a result of the transformation of the labour market and growth 
in social security policies has done little to address the risk of being poor. See 
for instance, David Cheal, New Poverty: Families in Postmodern Society 
(1999); National Coalition for the Homeless, 'Why are People Homeless?' Fact 
Sheet 1 (June 1999) 1 at 
<http://www.nationalhomeless.orgimentaLhtml> at 9 November 2002. 
117 Organised community care being provided in particular regions where there has 
been extensive evaluation of the process (by the Team for the Assessment of 
Psychiatric Services TAPS, for example). See Julian Leff, 'Evaluating the 
transfer of care from psychiatric hospitals to district-based services' (1993) 162 
(Suppl 19) British Journal of Psychiatry 6; Catherine O'Driscoll and Julian 
Leff,'The TAPS Project 8 design of the research study on the long-stay 
patients' (1993) 162 (Suppl19) British Journal of Psychiatry 18. 
118 Sonia Johnson, M Zinkler and Stephan Priebe 'Mental Health Service 
Provision in England' (2001) I04(Supp1410) Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica 
47. 
119 Double and Wong, above n Ill; Noam Trieman, Julian Leff and Gyles Glover, 
'Outcomes of long stay psychiatric patients resettled in the communlty: 
prospective cohort study' (1999) 319 British Medical Joumal13. 
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Critics of England's community mental health care system tend to be 
concerned with the excessive diversity of pattems of service delivery and 
support made available to severe chronic mentally ill patients in various 
localities. Mental health services providers have also been criticised for 
failing to seize the opportunity presented at the point of discharge from 
hospital or prison to intervene and ensure the person remains connected to 
services and does not become homeless. 121 As in Australia, strategies and 
policies linking former patients of particular institutions to conununity 
mental health services, public housing services, and the . social welfare 
s.ervice system have not been established and implemented equally in all 
localities, or within sunilar time frames or to the same extent. Yet in 
fairness to the institutions involved, the ever-shrinking resources for 
assisting an ever-expanding clientele to successfully make the transition to 
community life, is the explanation. Financial cutbacks under neo-liberal 
economic reform policies have seriously impaired the availability of 
community services and trained discharge planners. Shrinking resources 
remain an obstacle to achieving improvements in the perfonnance of these 
duties. Reducing the large regional variations in the availability of 
services has driven the United Kingdom government's implementation of 
its National SerVice Frameworkfor Mental Health 122 and National Health 
Service Plan 123 . 
In the absence of integrated management, what remains is a mosaic of 
fractured public and private services that cannot meaningfully cater to the 
needs of today's homeless chronic mentally ill popUlations and their 
transient lifestyles. This is now obvious to policy makers and social 
commentators alike. As Rosen and Teeson point out, despite the diverse 
health service structures in countries like the USA, the UK. and Australia, 
problems of under-funding leading to the neglect of individuals with 
chronic mental illness and co-morbidities, and of homelessness per:sist. 124 
These problems are closely linked to a lack of unified or integrated system 
of de-institutionalisation. The need for appropriate discharge planning, for 
community services, for adequate funding, for appropriate 
accommodation, for access to social and support services, for continuity of 
care and evaluative research has all since been stressed in the literature and 
121 Luke Binningham, 'Between Prison and the Community, The "revolving door 
psychiatric patient" of the nineties' (1999) 174 British Journal of PsychiatlJ' 
378. 
122 Department of Health, National Service Framework for Mental Health -
~.modemstandards and service models (1999) London. 
L, Department of Health, The National Health Sef'Vice Plan (2000) London. 
124 Alan Rosen and Maree Teeson, 'Does case management work? The evidence 
and the abuse of evidence-based medicine' (2001) 35 Australian and New 
Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 731, 732. 
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official reports as crucial for the success of community care programs. 115 
Indeed, Brian Pezzuti, Chair of the most recent New South Wales 
Parliamentary Inquiry into mental health services, describes the lack of 
adequate community services following the deinstitutionalisation process 
as responsible for the emergence of yet another form of 
institutionalisation: 'homelessness and imprisonment' .126 
More recently, the 'new generation' of chronically mentally ill persons, 
adolescents and young adults, may well pose the greatest challenge to the 
deinstitutionalisation project. They present the most difficult clinical 
problems in community treatment because they lack insight into their 
illnesses and consequently deny their need for mental health treatment 
including psychotropic medication. 127 Of great concern is the presence of 
accompanying primary substance-abuse disorders and the practice of self-
medication with 'street' drugs. There is growing evidence that chronic 
adolescent patients have 'swelled the ranks of the homeless mentally ill 
and the mentally ill in goal' .l28 Prisons, immigration detention centres and 
the streets are all present-day sites of exclusion for people with serious 
mental illness. 129 
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The homeless disabled with serious mental illness represent paradigm 
subjects whose continued suffering, through their exclusion, exemplifies 
the limits of modernisation. The modem social world in which these 
people live has not altered in such a way as to significantly improve their 
quality of life by alleviating their suffering, despite the promises of 
modernising interventions like de/non-institutionalisation. 
H Serious Mental Illness and Social Exclusion 
The process of 'othering' 130 is one way of explaining why some members 
of the population experience more extensive and intensive forms of 
exclusion than others. Othering is a process that defines 'who is in'l who 
is 'out', the 'civilized'/ the 'uncivilized' and the 'normal'/ the 'abnormal'. 
In a sense, the process is associated with intolerance and the atomizing of 
society. It is also part of the social exclusion imbroglio that further 
characterizes epochal changes associated with waste making 
modernisation. 
The fracturing and transformation of economic and social structures over 
the latter part of the twentieth century onwards has increased the sense of 
insecurity felt by people about their place in society. According to some 
sociologists, like Erving Goffman, some deal with this insecurity by 
stigmatising others perceived as weaker and less able to defend 
themselves. 131 People with mental illness have long been the targets of 
stigma and somehow trigger fear and resentment in others. In the process, 
the mentally ill are 'dehunianised' and treated as 'other' than those who 
have a right to respect. 
Othering is thus a process that can lead to a loss of 'mutual identification' 
in society' ,132 allowing some sections of the population to be persecuted, 
discriminated against, oppressed or even killed, while the central features 
130 'Otherness' is a tenn that originated in the writings of Hegel (1770-1831). 
Howard Becker developed his theory of labelling in the 1963 book Outsiders: 
Studies in the Sociology of Deviance. Many have presented their own approach 
to labelling theory such as Edwin Schur, Labelling Deviant Behaviour (1971). 
131 Erving Goffman, Stigma. Notes on the Management a/Spoiled Identity (1963). 
132 Robert Van Krieken, 'The Barbarism of Civilization: cultural genocide and the 
'stolen generations' or Elias in the Antipodes' (Paper presented at the Norbert 
Elias Centenary Conference 'Organized Violence: The Formation and 
Breakdown of Monopolies of Force - Conditions and Consequences', 
Amsterdam,18-20 December 1997). Van Krieken comments on the work of 
Norbert Elias in his discussion of history of colonialism and 'cultmal' genocide 
in Australia. 
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of 'civilization' appear to remain intact. l33 History tends to suggest that 
this has been the case for homeless people and for those we know as 
mentally ill-at least since the division between reason and madness, back 
beyond the mid-seventeenth century. 134 And yet, despite the acquisition of 
new knowledge and truths during the 'Enlightenment' and the 'Golden 
Age' of science and 'quantum leaps' in science and technology during the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the hOlTorsthat have been perpetrated 
on these people their suffering and exclusion to continue to be 
documented. 
Over the span of a few centuries this group of vulnerable individuals came 
to be revered as divine beings, perceived as harmless jesters or fools, or 
else feared as instruments of eviL The traumas that they have had to face 
include starvation, b11ltalisation and torture, and eventually exclusion and 
confinement, through the theft of their freedom and dignity by various 
means and to different extents. Today, issues of stigmatisation, 
victimisation, labelling and exclusion are more common focus of 
concem. 135 
'Asylum'in the Asylums: Reconceptualising Asylums as 
'Safe' Places 
Despite their shortcomings, having no psychiatric hospitals would be a far 
worse altemative to living with the admittedly unsettling, and at times 
horrific, conditions found in them. Asylums have and continue to provide 
minimum levels of care without which, many individuals could not survive 
present-day modemity. Secure shelter during periods of acute phases of 
mental illness is a life saving necessity that must be considered when 
discussing community based mental health care for poor people with 
severe mental illness. Much support can be found in the literature for 
providing asylum, a place of refuge for people vulnerable because of their 
mental illness. In this sense, hospitals, large or small, if sufficiently 
resourced, can offer nourishing food, dress and shelter from the vagaries of 
climate.136 Studies conducted in the late 1980s and early 1990s found that 
133 Ibid. 
134 Alan Sheridan, Michel Foucault The Will To Truth (1980) 16. 
135 See for instance, the work of the Social Exclusion Unit, above n 125 and in 
Australia, of the Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute at 
bttp:llwww.ahurLedu.au. 
136 Robert E Drake, Michaei Wallach and J Schuyler Hoffman, 'Housing 
Instability and Homeiessness Among Aftercare Patients of an Urban State 
Hospital' (1989) 40 Hospital and Community P,~ychiatry 46, 50; Isaac Marks, 
'Innovations in Mental Health Care Delivery' (1992) 160 British JouT11al uf 
Psychiatry 589. 
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some chronically mentally ill people absolutely require highly supportive 
living arrangements rather than improvised and temporary shelters hecause 
'there is a bed-rock of illness which will aiways need in-patient care 
however comprehensive the community resources'. [37 
The value of hospital care for some people with severe mental illness is 
based on the fact that a hospital is seen as 'a living alternative that 
provides basic amenities rather than as a treatment facility'. 138 All of their 
diverse service needs can be met under one roof rather than from different 
sites in the community. 139 This perspective is supported by many 
contemporary mental health reform policy documents and inquiries into 
mental health services. 140 The call is for an increase in psychiatric beds 
as a place of asylum not just crisis treatment. 
IV CONCLUSION 
Both interventions, the institutionalisation and subsequent 
deinstitutionalisation of people with mental illness, constitute responses to 
the social problem of where to warehouse the state's mentally ill citizens. 
Learning from the past includes acknowledging that values such as 
humanitarianism, welfarism and egalitarianism (theories of the old welfare 
state) have failed to protect the interests and rights of vulnerable, 
dependent and marginalised individuals. Such techniques failed because 
they were incremental in their design, ad hoc in their approach and 
misfocused in their object. 141 There is also no denying that for many, 
community mental health care works welL But for those others who aTe 
located at the margins of society, it is questionable whether in the 
transition from welfare state to market, state, their life choices and life 
chances have improved. Promises that· the de/non-institutionalisation 
reforms would improve opportunities and life choices for everyone are 
unfulfilled. Inexorably, vulnerable mentally ill citizens have suffered 
marginalisation and distress through seemingly benign, cost cutting 
measures. 
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The connnunity care model of the market-state has led to negativL 
consequences through the structured disempowerment of such people by 
placing them in a sometimes worse position than under the previous, 
highly criticised, 'social democratic' welfare state model. It is through 
deinstitutionalisation that the dialectical process exposed by the 
contradictions and tensions between the two conflicting forces of social 
control and social protection has culminated into a state of total exclusion 
of such people from health care, housing, employment and social life. 
In part, the failures of the past have been based on insufficient and 
inadequate understanding of the complex, multi-dimensional processes 
that trigger social exclusion. Such processes are influenced by an 
obsession with reducing funding levels associated with neo-liberal market 
fundamentalism. 
The deficiencies in present day mental health reform enterprises and 
practices must be overcome. History's'waming is that a different approach 
must be sought in these uncertain times. This encompasses change in the 
way we perceive others. To do otherwise, risks twenty-first century 
mental health reforms also being labelled as failures by future historians. 
